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THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE. By Samuel P. Huntington. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1957. Pp. xiii, 534. $7.50.
THROUGHOUT most of human history, armed combat has been a natural
part of man's lot, and military command a normal attribute of political leader-
ship. In many primitive communities this is still so. Even in modern civiliza-
tion the warrior-dictator crops up; Napoleon, Simon Bolivar, Francisco Franco
and Chiang Kai-shek are familiar examples.
For the last two centuries, however, the warrior-dictator has been a dwind-
ling, if not vanishing, species. The rise of the great nation-states, cultural
advance and economic growth, the establishment of standing armies and the
burgeoning of military science are among the many causes of separation of
the military calling from civil government and civilian pursuits. The necessary
corollary of separation is relation, and it is with the political aspects of civil-
military relations that Professor Huntington's book is concerned.
Whether by luck or good management, the British have seldom been troubled
on this score; but France and Germany have been bedevilled by the problem
ever since the time of Napoleon, and Japan since its emergence from feudalism
in 1868. The Tukachevsky purge of 1937 and the contemporary political promi-
nence of Zhukov and other Russian officers have revealed the same tensions
within the seeming monolith of the Soviet Union. In the United States, a
host of generals and admirals were precipitated into positions of unprecedented
political scope and influence during World War II and the ensuing "cold"
war and Korean campaign. Today there is a much more general awareness
of what only a few had realized before: the nation's military security is in
jeopardy and is likely so to remain as long as can now be foreseen; in peace
as in war the man in uniform is in the mainstream of national welfare; and
it is high time for the public role and responsibility of the military leaders to
be carefully examined and better understood.
To this profoundly important quest, Professor Huntington, who teaches
political science at Harvard, has made an impressive and provocative contri-
bution. Karl von Clausewitz, exploring "the nature of military phenomena,"
concluded that war is "the continuation of state policy by different [i.e. military]
means" and therefore "an affair of the whole nation."' Building on this theo-
retical foundation, Professor Huntington concerns himself not so much with
war as with the attainment and maintenance of "military security." He centers
his analysis on the military calling and its proper relationship to civil govern-
ment.
"The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military
officer a professional man. This is, perhaps, the most fundamental thesis of
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this book." 2 So Professor Huntington opens his exposition, and he develops
this thesis with power and a wealth of illustrative detail. Expertise, responsi-
bility and corporate consciousness are his indicia of professionalism, and he
finds all of them necessary attributes of the officer corps in modern western
civilization.
"The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer
corps to the state."'3 Professor Huntington accepts the basic concept of "civilian
control" of the military, but rightly recognizes that "this concept has never
been satisfactorily defined" and sorely needs exegesis. He seeks to give it
contour and substance by drawing a distinction between "subjective civilian
control," which is bad, and "objective civilian control," which is good.
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These two expressions are the principal theoretical tools which Professor
Huntington has devised, and their statement and application to the facts of life
are the core of his analysis. There is no "civil corps" in which civilian power
is vested. Except in a dictatorship, civilian power is divided in constantly
fluctuating ratios between a number of varied and competing political, eco-
nomic, and social groups. These civilian groups vie with each other for control
of the military. "Subjective civilian control" is the domination or assimilation
of the military by a particular segment of civilian power, whereas "objective
civilian control" preserves the professional autonomy of the military, so that its
unique outlook and ethic will be brought to bear on all segments of civilian
power. As Professor Huntington puts it:
"Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military,
making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves
its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state.
Subjective civilian control exists in a variety of forms, objective civilian
control in only one. The antithesis of objective civilian control is military
participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become
progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics.
Subjective civilian control, on the other hand, presupposes this involve-
ment. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of
autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian
control is the denial of an independent military sphere. Historically, the
demand for objective control has come from the military profession,
the demand for subjective control from the multifarious civilian groups
anxious to maximize their power in military affairs." 5
After a chapter designed to illustrate his theory by a discussion of German
and Japanese military history, Professor Huntington devotes the balance and
bulk of his book to tracing the course of civil-military relations in the United
States. As he sees it, the American officer corps lived in isolation until World
War II. Then its leaders acquired great political power, but only by the
sacrifice of their professional outlook and their acceptance of the unmilitary
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This last conclusion reflects another fundamental ingredient of the book, which
sweeps far beyond the bounds of the civil-military equation, and is of so contro-
versial a nature as to preclude general acceptance. "Liberalism," says Professor
Huntington, "has always been the dominant ideology in the United States."" He
defines liberalism as an amalgam of several ingredients-individualism, faith
in human capacity for improvement, hostility to power and distrust of the mili-
tary. In contrast, the military ethic is "at one with" conservatism, as exemplified
not by Herbert Hoover, but Edmund Burke. Violence is rooted in the nature
of man, whose weakness and selfishness can be governed only by "organization,
discipline, and leadership." Man "realizes himself only in groups," and there-
fore: "the military ethic is basically corporative in spirit. It is fundamentally
anti-individualistic."
7
Thus, in Professor Huntington's view, a well-nigh irreconcilable conflict
exists between military professionalism and the prevailing temper of civilian
life in the United States. Because of this tension, the officer corps developed
in isolation, and our military leaders have achieved political influence only
by an apostate embracement of the liberal viewpoint.
Whatever the reader may think of these premises, the author's deduction is
logical and categorical: "The requisite for military security is a shift in basic
American values from liberalism to conservatism." Again, "the stronger the
military voice, the less the likelihood of conflict" between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we should renounce our liberalism and the
Russians their communism in favor of conservatism. And we should listen
respectfully to the generals, whether of the Pentagon or the Kremlin; only
then will the prospects of a "peaceful adjustment between the two nations"
be good. 9
It seems bootless here to discuss whether liberals and conservatives correspond
to the stereotypes-one might almost call them daguerrotypes--in the author's
mental gallery, or whether the military man is by virtue of his calling inherently
conservative, or whether Professor Huntington's pungent penchants are "right"
or "wrong." What seems most unfortunate, at least to this reviewer, is that
the author's political opinions have surged like a tidal wave over the theo-
retical and historical structure of his book. Much of his message has thus been
engulfed in needless controversy. "The military officer must remain neutral
politically," Professor Huntington admonishes his readers.' 0 If so, the same
precept might well be taken to heart by those who grapple with the vexed
question of civil-military relations, at least while they are in the throes of the
struggle.
For lack of restraint in this regard, the high hopes kindled by the sober,








character and moves toward a conclusion that is nothing more than a political
tract for the times. In the process, the author's chosen concepts disintegrate
and then return as ghosts to haunt him. Having condemned "subjective civilian
control" because it makes the military into a "mirror" of the civilian state,
Professor Huntington turns full circle and exhorts the civilian to abandon
"liberalism" and mirror the "conservative" outlook of the military. What
would this be but "subjective military control" of the civilian world? Perhaps
that is what Professor Huntington really wants; his closing lesson for the
day is that America can learn more from West Point than West Point from
America.
True, the civilian and the professional soldier have much to learn from each
other, and for nearly a century the lessons went unlearned on both sides. For this
the blame must rest chiefly on the civilian, or rather on the complacent, isolated
American environment which fostered civilian indifference and hostility to
the man in uniform. Many would say that during World War II and its after-
math the ice has been broken, and that there has been a considerable growth
of mutual respect and understanding. But not Professor Huntington, for
whom the civilian has learned little or nothing from the military, and the military
has picked up a mess of bad, "liberal" habits from the civilian.
All this provocative overlay is likely to distract the reader from the book's
more solid features. The expression "professional soldier" has now been taken
into everyday usage; nevertheless, as the author points out, in neither military
nor social literature has the officer generally been treated as a professional man.
For most purposes, this is a sound approach to the civil-military equation. The
drive of professionalism stimulates skill and foresight, independence of mind,
pride in a noble calling, responsibility to an ideal. Any officer corps will benefit
enormously if animated by such concepts, which also help define the officer's
proper role in affairs of state.
Of course, the characterization must not be taken too literally. Profound
differences exist between the military calling and the "classic" professions-
medicine, law, and theology-which turn on a counseling relation to the
threatened or stricken individual, to aid him in coping with bodily ills, the
slings and arrows of his enemies, or the awfulness of infinity. An officer's
responsibility is to the State; so he is in part a bureaucrat. But he is the
State's counselor and agent against its enemies foreign and perhaps domestic.
And while his calling embraces a wonderful variety of skills, at the top of his
profession the officer becomes, in Professor Harold Lasswell's phrase, a special-
ist in "the management of violence."
The principle of "objective civilian control" is perhaps the most original.and
certainly the most important of the book's contributions to politico-military
theory. "Civilian control" has become a piece of cant that politicians mouth
worshipfully but with little understanding. This is an area where iconoclasm
is badly needed; Professor Huntington's store of this commodity seems virtu-
ally inexhaustible, and it is refreshing to follow his trail of destructive exposure.
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To the Senator or Representative, "civilian control" means Congressional power
over the military, at the expense of the Executive. To Franklin D. Roosevelt,
it meant control by the President as Commander-in-Chief, not by the Secre-
taries of War and Navy. To the National Guardsman, apparently, it means
control preferably by the National Guard Association, if necessary by Con-
gress, but in no event by the federal executive branch.
As an aid to clear thought and perception, the distinction betveen "sub-
jective" and "objective" civilian control is useful. Substantively too, it is plainly
desirable that no one branch of the government, and no one segment of civilian
power, should dominate the military establishment. To a degree the constitu-
tional separation of powers prevents such a result, but Professor Huntington
views this factor with a very jaundiced eye, perceiving that rivalry between
the legislative and executive branches tends to draw the generals into "political
conflicts." Therefore, he concludes, the separation of powers "has been a major
hindrance to the development of military professionalism and civilian control
in the United States."'1
Once again, the confusion results from the intrusion of Professor Hunting-
ton's own political preconceptions. At bottom, it appears, he does not himself
believe in "objective," but rather in "conservative," civilian control. He declares
for a "politically neutral officer corps," but defines the "military ethic" as
essentially "conservative." He wants the American military voice to be heeded,
but usually does not like what he hears when it speaks. His historical treatment
of American military institutions is both readable and enlightening, but his only
heroes, military or civilian, are those who fit his particular "conservative"
description. Among those who conspicuously fail to pass through the eye of
this needle are Herbert Hoover, Douglas MacArthur, Andrew Carnegie, and,
from abroad, Erich Ludendorff.
The book has many gaps and a few sad lapses. Of the latter, perhaps the
worst is the section on German military history. The German officer corps
embodied solid values, but it also glistened in a way that seems to have blinded
Professor Huntington to certain of its other, less attractive features. Under
his own definitions, technical competence is not equivalent to professionalism,
and Professor Huntington seems to have learned little from his reading of
Gordon Craig's monumental study, cited among his reference notes.1
Reviewing The Soldier and the State in The New York Tines Book Re-
view,13 Walter Millis reveals that his copy is "marked with explosive disagree-
ment" on "nearly every other page." So is mine, by way of notes on the blank
pages at the back. Mr. Millis concluded that Professor Huntington's work is
"well worth reading" but "in the end.., a failure." There is no doubt about
the first of these verdicts, but the second seems unduly harsh. No book is a
failure that cuts deep into a tangle of vital problems of state policy and struc-
11. P. 177.
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ture at a point where few have attempted and fewer have achieved a pene-
tration. Professor Huntington has broken new ground, and no one who is
seriously concerned with civil-military relations in the modern state should
fail to read his book.
TELFORD TAYLoRt
THE SUPREME COURT. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: The Ronald Press,
1957. Pp. vii, 429. $6.50.
THE Constitution, Mr. justice Jackson observed shortly before his death,
provides the President and the Congress with "a fairly formidable political
power over the Supreme Court, if there were a disposition to exert it."1 Recent
history suggests that, however successful in the nineteenth century, attempts
to change the number of Justices, narrow the Court's appellate jurisdiction,
ignore its mandates or sharply reduce its appropriations today would probably
offend what appears to be entrenched popular sensitivity to threats to the
Court's independence. More important, any growing impetus to serious con-
sideration of such curbs is usually dissipated by a Court that maintains respect
for its authority by responding, sooner or later, to felt public needs. The Su-
preme Court must in the long run operate within the limits of popular accept-
ance, and this fact imposes a heavy obligation upon those whose task is to
mediate between the Court and the man in the street. Editors, columnists, com-
mentators and articulate community leaders of course do more than reflect the
public's attitude; they shape it. Their criticism must be informed, thoughtful
and responsible if the Court is to function in a climate that is compatible with
the exercise of enlightened judicial conscience and is in turn productive of it.
Such criticism presupposes understanding. Professor Schwartz, troubled by
what he deems to be unwarranted abuse of the Court, has written this book in
an effort to explain the Court to the opinion-molders. He "has sought to deal
with all the important areas of the Court's work, while at the same time seek-




The substance of the book is an effort to show, by particularized analysis of
legal issues, the Court's relationship to the Congress, the President, the ad-
ministrative agencies and the states. The author's special focus is upon the
past twenty years.
The "central theme" is the Court's dramatic abandonment in 1937 of its
post-Civil War inclination to act as a "super-legislature" that freely invalidated
laws whose wisdom was disputed by five of the nine Justices. In the broad
perspective of Professor Schwartz's study, deference to the elected representa-
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